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one m 
two sons. The then charged him 
with two counts of le\vd conduct. After losing his motion to suppress the statements he made at 
parole-related proceedings and pied guilty to one count lewd 
district court denying Po\vell's motion to suppress his statements and 
were in violation 
incrimination. During the parole Mr. Powell 
to or risk 
He to incriminated himself, 
vacate J 
to suppress, and courL 
In June 2006, Powell's son, 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-
a classic penalty situation. He either 
pnson, a penalty which amounted to 
was charged convicted as a 
reverse 
to 's step-father Mr. Powell had 
molested him. (Defendant's Exhibit 1 to 7/16/15 Rule Hearing2 ("Def. l "), 
p.3.) During course 
sons, S.A. and J.A. J.A. told the police that he remembered taking a shower with Mr. Powell 
1 The record sometimes refers to Mr. Powell's three sons by the last names "Powell" and 
"Arnold." It appears their last name is currently Arnold. 
2 Mr. Powell attached Defendant's Exhibit 1 to the motion to augment the record, which he filed 
along with this brief. 
not 1, 
The court with seven 
In 2013, Powell had nearly finished serving his fixed time was being considered 
parole. As of parole process, he met parole 
At 
officer Dianna Carnell in 
13 for a . (R., Mr. Powell 
disclosed another incident involving Z.A., and admitted that he had molested his two other boys, 
and S.A. (Id.) Ms. reported Mr. Powell's disclosure to and 
recommended that Po\vell be paroled. (Id) 
Mr. Powell went front of July 13. 
sons, a friend, were all (R., pp.60-64.) Powell made same admissions to 
as ) 
15. (R., p.63.) 
In General's office 
Mr. Po\vell his (R., pp.65-81.) State 
filed Mr. in this case-one count of and one count 
of lewd conduct for (R., pp.27-28.) 
Mr. Powell filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained while he was 
incarcerated and participating in the parole process, including what he said during the pre-parole 
3 It appears that on page 10 of Defendant's Exhibit 1, the reporting officer accidentally refers to 
S.A. as J.A. 
2 
of 
10/8/14 
and were thus 
- p.29, I 0.) 
(R., 
on the other hand, 
Mr. Powell had no right against self-incrimination during the parole process, he never 
that 
right, and he the from the Idaho Attorney General's Office freely 
voluntarily. (R., pp.101-06; see also 10/8/14 Tr., p.23, 18 p.24, L.20.) 
district court denied Mr. Pm.vell's motion: 
The situation here came about [Mr. Powell] elected to proceed 
with the request for parole. Part of the parole process, as was explained by 
Ms. Carnell, was that they're asked certain questions that they're expected to 
answer. And that has to do with a lot of things. It's not-not related to charging 
them with crimes. That's someone else's jurisdiction. But it has to do with 
contacting victims and making sure that someone is to be able to make it 
once they're on parole. So pmi of the parole process is to ask about other 
at least in a sex offender situation. 
thing because the issue is statements 
\Vere voluntary [sic]. First, was not promised that there would no 
prosecutions if proceeded to answer the questions, required to go through the 
parole Certainly he had hope, but Ms. Carnell has made it clear that 
was no promises [sic]-no promises were given him. The issue becomes 
somewhat confused in that defense raised the issue as to whether the-by 
making the statements that would be used against him, it appears that the parole 
board does not use these statements against him since they elected to proceed and 
recommend parole. It's Kootenai County who's bringing the new charges based 
upon, at least in part I guess, upon statements that have been made. 
So the issue was whether his statements were voluntary. And there was 
one case I Yersus Warden, ... where the court an 
issue similar to this in front of it and stated: "The voluntary statement or 
interview, however, even when given the hope of improving the inmate's chances 
for parole, is not compelled and therefore is not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment." Certainly I could see where there would be cases where perhaps it 
could be a different statement. But here there was nothing compelled against-
nothing to compel the defendant other than his desire to be released prior to the 
expiration of his unified term. And that does not render his statements 
3 
to statements 
to one count 
136-38; 10/24/14 Tr.) Both in the 
of plea court 
to challenge district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., ; 10/24/14 
Mr. never filed a to 4 
he could have challenged on appeal, and the denial that Mr. Powell to 
was the order his motion to 
is properly before this 
with two fixed, to run concurrent 
5 5 Powell 1, 
4 Defense did a on a to "''"''H"''"'· 
Powell is scheduled to be paroled in this case at the 16. 
4 
5 
to 
a 
are 
constitutional principles to the State v. Page, 1 Idaho 1, (2004) 
V. 
The Fifth 
a 
135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000)). 
that no "'""""n "shall be compelled any case 
himself." 
against 
subsequent 
use of a 
trial. 
Supreme Court 
compelled answers 
v. Radford, I 
78 (1973)). 
to 
statements he 
held the Fifth 
I 87, 193 (2000) 
statements 
himself or 
of that 
This Court should vacate Mr. Powell's judgment 
denying his to and to district court. 
The Fifth Amendment "not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a 
criminal trial in vvhich is a defendant, also 'privileges him not to answer official 
put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 
6 
m V. 
not turn upon of proceeding which its is invoked, but 
nature of statement or and the which it invites."' ( quoting 
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967))). Thus, "[a] defendant does not lose this protection 
reason of conviction of a crime .... " 465 U.S. at a general rule, 
countervailing government interests, as criminal rehabilitation, do not trump this right." 
United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th 2005); see also id. at 1134-35 ("when 
'questions put to [a) probationer, however relevant to his probationary call for answers 
that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution,' he may properly invoke 
his right to remain silent") (quoting },;furphy, 465 U.S. at 435). Therefore, the privilege applies 
regardless of the type of proceeding or the government interests at issue, so long as the 
sought a risk of 
B. Because Mr. Powell Faced A "Classic Penaltv Situation." He Did Not Waive His Fifth 
Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination 
A defendant does not necessarily waive the privilege by failing to invoke it. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1vfurphy explained that a witness "ordinarily must assert the privilege 
rather than ans,.ver if he desires not to incriminate himself," AifwJJhy, 465 at 429, but that the 
general rule is "inapplicable in cases where assertion so as to 
'foreclos( e J a free choice to remain silent, and ... compe[l] ... incriminating testimony,"' id. at 
434 ( quoting Garner v. United States, 
ongmal)). lviurphy went on to explain: 
U.S. 648, 661 (1976) (omissions and alterations in 
7 
at 
however probationary 
incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution. 
There is a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the state, 
either or implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would 
lead to revocation ol probation. it v,muld have created the classic penalty 
situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the 
probationer's annvers would be compelled and inadmissible in a 
( emphasis added and footnote omitted). Court found, that Murphy's 
condition did not create a classic 
only statements; it said 
and certainly contained no 
his Fifth Amendment privilege with 
Here, on other Mr. Powell 
Mr. 
and himself. a 
situation because his "probation condition 
his freedom to decline to answer particular 
probation was conditional on his 
to further criminal prosecution. Id at 4 3 7. 
penalty 
not 
IS as 
the threat of losing the ability to parole out amounted to a penalty even though this case 
involved losing a at parole rather than having probation or parole infra, 
pp.10-11.) 
to be a 
Mr. Powell's Fifth Amendment Rights Were Violated Because His Statements Led To 
His Incrimination And, Had He Not Incriminated Himself. He Would Not Have Been 
Paroled 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no np·~"'""" "shall be compelled in any criminal case 
against himself." The U.S. Court has to articulate what 
8 
court to 
a 
that: (I) the testimony sought by government carried the of 
and (2) the penalty faced refusing to testify amounted to compulsion. 
Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134; see also A1cKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) (J. O'Connor, 
concurring6) ("The text of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all penalties levied in response 
to a person's refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only the compulsion of such 
testimony. . . . [ A ]s suggested by the text of Fifth Amendment, we hare asked whether the 
imposed in such situations rises lo a level it is likely to 'compe[l} · a person 'to 
be a witness against himse(l "') ( emphasis added). 
The first prong requires that the \Vitness face "'a real and appreciable danger of self-
incrimination. Antelope, 395 F.3d at 11 (quoting li1cCoy v. Comm 'r, 969 F.2d 1234, 1236 
1983)). "This is not to ... that the prosecutorial sword must actually strike or be 
poised to strike," but the threat cannot be "remote, unlikely, or speculative." Id. at 11 Here, 
the risk of incrimination could not be more real and appreciable. Mr. Powell was charged with 
two additional felonies because of the statements he made during the parole process, he pied 
guilty to one charge after he lost his motion to suppress those statements, and he was sentenced 
to serve two to twenty years in prison. 
The second prong asks "whether the government has sought to 'impose substantial 
penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give 
6 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was the narrowest and thus controls. See Antelope, 
395 F.3d at 1133 n.1. 
9 
11 
answer 1s has 
liberty as a result of invoking his Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 1139. 
main difference between the penalties in Antelope and case 1s Antelope 
additional burden incarceration, while Mr. Powell faced losing the benefit of parole. 
as Justice plurality opinion in A1cKune 
a difference. 
A1cKune addressed an inmate's claim that sex-offender treatment 
which required that he admit to all past or else lose his "privilege status" his 
536 U.S. at 1. When inmate refused to participate, 
went a as 
opportunities, canteen access to a television. Id. at 31. Although 
plurality, along with Justice O'Connor concurring, went on to hold that loss of privileges in 
A1cKune were not severe enough to compel a person to incriminate himself, id. at 36, 48-49, 
Justice Kennedy took the to explain that benefit versus burden comparison is 
The prison ,varden in this case stated that it is largely a matter of chance where in 
a prison an inmate is assigned. Even if Inmates A and B are serving the same 
sentence for the same crime, Inmate A could end up in a medium-security unit 
and Inmate B in a maximum-security unit based solely on administrative factors 
beyond their control. Under respondent's view, ho\vever, the Constitution allows 
the State to offer Inmate B the opportunity to live in the medium-security unit 
conditioned on his participation in the SA TP, but does not allow the State to offer 
Inmate A the opportunity to in that same medium-security subject to the 
10 
is extending a benefit or taking away a privilege rests entirely in of 
beholder. For this reason, emphasis of any baseline, while superficially appealing, ·would be an 
inartfid addition to an already conji1sed area (~/jurisprudence." Id. (emphasis added); see 
id ('"We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn bet\veen "enhancing" the punishment 
imposed upon the petitioner and denying him "leniency" he claims would be appropriate if 
he had cooperated. (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 n.4 (1980)). 
According to the plurality's reasoning, it makes no difference that Mr. Powell would lose 
only the ability to be placed on parole as opposed to having his parole revoked. Nor is it 
dispositive that Mr. Powell had only the opportunity for parole. See Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 
807 the coercion . . . we must 
likely (ij attainrnent. Prudent 
into account potential 
weigh heavily such legally unenfhrceable 
in making decisions; to removal of those prospects constitutes economic 
coercion.") This is all the more true because Mr. Powell was actually granted parole. (R., p.63.) 
The penalty here (not being paroled) practically speaking, no different than penalty 
Antelope (having probation revoked). Because Mr. Powell faced a penalty which amounted to 
compulsion and his statements actually incriminated him, the use of his statements in this case 
violated his Fifth Amendment right court 
those statements and their fruits. See Radford, 134 Idaho at 193 ( quoting Turley, 414 U.S. at 78). 
11 
over 
to 7 
district court violated his right against by relinquishing jurisdiction 
to participate in a polygraph Court of 
[B]ased on the kfcKune holding that can be no compulsion the 
consequences of invoking the right self-incrimination do not implicate a 
defendant's liberty interests, and the Coassolo holding that defendants in the 
retained jurisdiction program do not have a liberty interest in probation, we 
conclude that the district court's demands did not amount to compulsion in regard 
to the Fifth Amendment analysis. Van did not have a liberty interest in 
probation, so relinquishing jurisdiction could not implicate his liberty interests. 
Because relinquishing jurisdiction could not implicate Van Komen's liberty 
interests, relinquishing jurisdiction also could not amount to compulsion. While 
Van Komen's choice between refusing the polygraph and receiving his underlying 
sentence vvas no doubt a difficult one, the court did not the Constitution by 
requiring him to choose. Thus, the district court did not violate Van Komen's 
Fifth Amendment rights or abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. 
2015 WL 7785342, at *4. The Van Court's holding on misreading 
two U.S. Supreme Court cases, was wrongly decided, and should not govern here. 
1. The Van Ko men Court's Holding Turned On Its Misunderstanding Of 1vfcKune 
The Van Komen Court mistakenly found the holding in McKune to be that "there can 
7 After Van Kamen came out, Mr. Powell moved to suspend the briefing in this case because Van 
Komen decided an issue similar to the one here and Van Komen was not yet final. The State 
objected, explaining that "[i]t is unclear how the Court of Appeals' narrow holding in Van 
Komen that the district court did not violate Van Komen's rights by considering his refusal to 
take a polygraph examination in deciding to relinquish jurisdiction has any bearing on whether 
Powell's statements at his parole hearing should have been suppressed." (Objection to "Motion 
to Suspend the Briefing Schedule" and Statement in Support Thereof, p.3.) This 
Mr. Pmvell's motion, and Mr. Van Komen has since filed a petition for review. 
12 
O'Connor concurring. Van Konzen attempted to find the common ground between the 
plurality and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, explaining: 
Although the plurality and Justice O'Connor disagreed on what standard 
applies to define a liberty interest, they agreed that there can be no compulsion 
where the consequences of invoking the right do not implicate a defendant's post-
sentencing libe1iy interests. In her conctmence, Justice O'Connor stated that 
longer incarceration a penalty for refusing to incriminate oneself would surely 
implicate a 'liberty interest"' and constitute compulsion. 
Van Kamen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3 (quoting 536 U.S. at 52). 
As an initial matter, the Van Komen court's attempt to craft a holding out of both the 
plurality and concurring opinions in AfcKune was itself improper. See Van Komen, 2015 WL 
7785342, at The Supreme Court instructed that. plurality opinions, the Court's 
holding is "'that position taken by Members who concurred in judgments on the 
narrowest grounds. Antelope, 395 F.3d at 11 n.1 v. United 430 U.S. 
193 (1977)). the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have agreed, Justice O'Connor's 
opinion was narrowest 
1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002); Searcy v. Sirnmons, 299 F 
concurred only in the result, 
holding in },lcKune, as 
explicitly rejected 
by Justice 
id.; Ainsivorth v. Stanley, 3 I 7 F.3d 
1225 (10th Cir. 2002). Justice O'Connor 
plurality's reasoning. Therefore, the 
herself, is in 
conditions in that case were not a penalty sufficient enough to amount to compulsion. See 
McKune, 536 U.S. at ("I find the plurality's failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination troubling. But because this case 
indisputably involves burdens rather than I not penalties 
13 
m to fare on 
not state that a liberty ,nt,~,·pct was a prerequisite to compulsion.8 In concluding as 
plucked read it to mean something 
than what it actually says, and ignored the remainder of Justice O'Connor's reasoning to 
that both Justice O'Connor and the plurality a liberty interest is a prerequisite to 
finding compulsion. 
The paragraph on which the Van Komen Court relied states in full: 
Although I do not think the penalties respondent faced were sufficiently 
serious to compel his testimony, I do not agree with the suggestion in the plurality 
opinion that these penalties could permissibly rise to the level of those in cases 
like AtfcGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding that statements made 
in the mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing may be used as evidence of 
guilt), Bordenkircher r. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that plea bargaining 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), and 
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (holding that there 
is no right to at a at 2028-2030. The 
8 Further, it is not entirely clear that the plurality found a liberty interest to be a prerequisite to 
compulsion. First, the plurality did not adopt the process test from Sandin v. Conner, 515 
472 (1995), but explained: 
The determination under Sandin ·whether a prisoner's liberty interest has been 
curtailed may not provide a precise parallel for determining ,vhether there is 
compelled self-incrimination, but it does provide useful instruction for answering 
the latter inquiry. Sandin and its counterparts underscore the axiom that a 
convicted felon's life in prison differs from that of an ordinary citizen. In the 
context of a legitimate rehabilitation program prisoners, those same 
considerations are relevant to our analysis. The compulsion inquily must consider 
the significant restraints already inherent in prison life and the State's own vital 
interests in rehabilitation goals and procedures within the prison system. 
McKune, 536 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). Second, the plurality explicitly rejected the notion 
that extending benefits would be permissible while imposing burdens would not. Id. at 46 
("[W]hether the government is extending a benefit or taking away a privilege rests entirely in the 
eye of the beholder. For this reason, emphasis of any baseline, while superficially appealing, 
would be an inartful addition to an already confused area of jurisprudence."). 
14 
536 U.S. at (J. O'Connor, concurring) (emphasis added and citations reformatted). 
First, the Court took one part of one sentence (indeed, the only sentence in 
Justice O'Connor's opinion that contained the term "liberty interest") out of context to support 
its reasoning. See Van Komen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3. In the above paragraph, Justice 
O'Connor explained that she disagreed with the plurality's implication that certain penalties 
addressed in earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases~-including longer incarceration and execution-
vvould not be sufficiently compelling to violate the Fifth Amendment. A1cKune, 536 U.S. at 52. 
She explained that the stakes in those cases \vere greater than the stakes the Court had already 
held to be impermissible in the penalty which included the loss of one's job, 
professional license, or government contract. 
as longer and would 
statement did not, as the Van Komen 
id at 49-50. She then said that penalties such 
implicate a liberty 
concluded, adopt the 
" id at 52. 
O'Connor to write a concurring opinion in the first place. 
rationale that led 
Van Ko men, 2015 WL 
7785342, at *3. Instead, that statement appears to have been aimed at undercutting the 
plurality's reliance on Sandin, given that the plurality found that penalties which clearly 
implicated liberty interests would be permissible. See 1\lfcKune, 536 U.S. at 
Second, Van Court that sentence to mean something than it 
actually says. See Van Kamen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3. The Court correctly stated that Justice 
O'Connor found longer incarceration would be an impermissible penalty (though apparently the 
plurality disagreed), and that longer incarceration implicates a liberty interest. See 1\1cKune, 
15 
at 
outcomes 
oneself would surely implicate a liberty interest (J. O'Connor, 
But Justice O'Connor did not-even once-link those two propositions or 
otherwise say or imply that a liberty interest was a prerequisite for compulsion.9 
In concluding otherwise, the Van Kornen Court not only misread those two but 
relied on a logical fallacy known as "denying the antecedent." See generally Stephen M. 
Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent as a Litigation 
Tool, Miss. LJ. 669 (2010). "The proposition that 'A implies B' is not the equivalent of 
implies non-B,' and neither proposition follows logically from the other. Crouse-Hinds 
Co. v. lnterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Agri Processor Co. v. 
NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In other \Vords, just 
is sufficient to compel (B), does not mean that penalties that do not 
liberty interests (non-A) are insufficient to compel testimony (non-B). 
Third, the Van Komen Court overlooked the bulk of Justice O'Connor's opinion when 
construing the kfcKune holding. See Van Komen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3. As the whole of her 
opinion makes clear, Justice O'Connor focused not on the presence of a liberty interest, but on 
9 For this same reason, the Court of Appeals mistakenly contended that Van Komen's reliance on 
Antelope was misplaced. Van Komen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *4 n.3. Antelope had the benefit of 
Justice O'Connor specifically stating that, in her view, longer incarceration would amount to an 
impermissible penalty. The Antelope plurality did not, however, read Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in McKune to mean that only penalties implicating a liberty interest could 
amount to compulsion. See Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128. 
16 
was to 
text not 
resoo11se to a person's refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only 
the compulsion of such testimony. Not all necessarily "compel[s]" 
incriminating statements. 
[A]s suggested by the text of the Fifth 1,fe have asked the 
pressure imposed in such situations rises to a level 1vvhere it is likely to 
"compe[l]" a person "to be a witness against himself" 
The same analysis applies to penalties imposed upon a person as a result 
of the failure to incriminate himself-some penalties are so as to 
"compe[l}" such testimony, while others do not rise to that level. 
536 U.S. at 49 (J. O'Connor, concurring) (emphasis added). Had Justice O'Connor 
thought that only penalties involving liberty interests could be sufficiently compelling, she would 
said so. 
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court's early penalty cases, on which both lvfurphy and 
relied, did not require that a liberty at stake. Afarphy, U.S. at 5· 
' 
536 at on nature 
("[T]he of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, 
and imprisonment are not penalties capable forcing 
self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.") (emphasis added); Spevack v. Klein, 385 
511, 515-16 (1967) (Penalty "means, as we said in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,614 
(1965) imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
'costly.' threat of disbarment the of 
reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lmvyer relinquish the 
privilege.") (plurality opinion) ( citations reformatted). Therefore, the Court rejected 
that a property interest was necessary for a valid Fifth Amendment claim: 
17 
claim 
(''l 
we must 
economic benefits realistically likely <~f attainment. Prudent persons ·weigh 
heavily such legally unenforceable prm,pects in making decisions; to that 
removal of those prospects constitutes economic coercion. 
Finally, Justice O'Connor specifically criticized the plurality's reliance on the due 
m V. 515 the 
which state prison regulations created a liberty interest: 
I find the plurality's failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination troubling. But because this 
case indisputably involves burdens than benefits, and because I do not 
believe the penalties assessed against respondent in response to his failure to 
incriminate himself are compulsive on I not resolve this 
dilemma to make my judgment in this case. 
Although I not is same as 
the process we ident{jied in S'andin, I join in the judgment reached 
the plurality's opinion. 
U.S. at see id. at 
with compulsion is broader than 
hardship' \Ve have adopted for evaluating 
claims prisons .... 
Justice O'Connor was concerned only with \Vhether the penaity imposed was 
so, this is 
itself precludes. Not once did she qualify that standard with any prerequisite that 
the penalty involve a liberty interest. The Van Komen Court's conclusion that both Justice 
O'Connor and the plurality agreed that "there can be no compulsion where the consequences of 
invoking not 1S 
18 
15 at 
Van Komen Court relied in Supreme Court's decision in Murphy, 
court h:=is hekl was no a 
the court would revoke his probation absent truthful statements to his probation officer." Van 
15 WL 7785342, at 465 at 434-39). statement is not 
accurate. As the 1vfurphy Court made clear, Murphy's fear was W?finmded and therefore 
not have compelled him to speak. The Court said: ·'On its Murphy's probation 
proscribed only false it nothing about his freedom to decline to answer 
questions and certainly contained no his probation was conditional on 
at alL 
Court to 
probation based on a probationer's invocation of his right to silent likely amount 
to a penalty situation: 
There is ... a substantial basis our cases for concluding that if either 
expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege v,:ould lead to 
revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the 
to assert the privilege would be excused, the probationer's answers 
would compelled inadmissible in a 
465 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added footnote omitted); see also 
Contrary to Van Komen's reasoning, Murphy supports Mr. Powell's claim in this case. 
19 
pp.7-8. 
having the opportunity to sufficient to compel Powell to 
himself. incriminating statements were ultimately used against him, 
in his conviction and incarceration in this case. Because Mr. Powell's statements were taken 
of his Fifth Amendment rights, the district court 
requests that this Court vacate his 
denying his motion to 
this 5th day of 2016. 
denying his motion to 
and reverse the district 
Deputy State Appellate Public 
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